08SEP1781 – Eutaw Springs: Continentals and Militias Assemble for a Coordinated Push Against the British

Artist rendering of the Battle of Eutaw Springs

In my last post, Marion was west of Charleston working his routing of British forces caught off guard when Marion set the stage on the last day of August 1781:

On 31AUG1781 at Parker’s Ferry Marion finally gets his battle with Lt. Col. Ernst Leopold von Borck. The British on 29AUG1781 had moved to Isaac Hayne’s Plantation where Issac was just buried and Brig. Gen. Marion had followed this force again and sets up his camp only five miles away. Marion conceals his men in a swamp beside the causeway and directs Col. William Harden’s men o move back 100 yards from the ambush line so they can be used as reserves. Maj. Samuel Cooper and sixty swordsmen are told to attack the rear of the enemy after the ambush is initiated. They then wait for an opportunity.

That opportunity came and Marion’s victory had the balance of British forces in South Carolina outside of Charlestown a bit nervous. The Continentals under Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Green also used the momentum from the summer’s push against the British to make his move.

Nathaniel Greene had completed resting his troops in the cooler climate of the High Hills of the Santee (only 15 miles from the British, each could see the other’s camp fires) about the same time that Marion went to the aid of Harden the other side of Charleston, he decided to engage the 1500 men under Rawdon’s replacement Alexander Stewart.

Separated by an impassible lake swollen with the summer rains Greene decided to go against the logic of moving south and then upriver to engage the Brit forces directly. Greene chose to go counter-clockwise at a slow pace moving only in the cool morning and early evening to conserve the men’s strength.

Greene himself had 1250 men but needed militia to help make up the difference. Virginia had promised 2000 militia but with Cornwallis in their backyard they opted to have them stay there. Greene’s route took him close to NC where he picked up some untested militia (150-200) under French commander Malmady. He also picked up 300 men under Pickens (some were former Sumter troops), William Henderson’s (Sumter replacement) 200 SC state troops and William Washington’s Virginia Continental Cavalry.

Lt. Col. Alexander Stewart had heard of Greene’s intention and moved 40 miles south down the Santee to Eutaw Springs specifically to take on supplies from Charleston. The supply line from Georgetown as no more and only a single stand of supplies was available to this British force.

Greene was well aware that Marion was working the other side of Charleston but was hoping he could make it back in time to be a factor now against the Brits who we on the move towards Charlestown. Greene stalled on 02SEP1781 in case he heard of Marion’s location. This allowed the British to feel secure near Eutaw Springs as the summer heat held on in the Carolinas. In summary, it is early in September and the 1,400 well-equipped British camp in cool shade beside the gushing springs of Eutaw, little dreaming that the fairly large Patriot army is close upon their heels.

Present day Eutaw Springs environment (photo taken Nov 2018 from the Eutaw Springs battlefield north overlooking the nearby waters)

Communique sent on 04SEP1781 to Marion that said Greene was collecting his force and planning to attack the British on the next day. On 05SEP1781, Greene received Marion’s Parker Ferry report and found out that Marion was only 20 miles south of Eutaw Springs. Yet another communique was sent and Marion used the nighttime to circle clockwise around Stewart’s Brit forces and by 07SEP1781 was together with Greene at Burdell’s Tavern just seven miles above Eutaw Springs. Marion’s plantation at Pond Bluff was only four miles away, this was home turf for the Swamp Fox.

Maj. Gen. Greene, hearing of the French plan to have Gen. George Washington’s encircle and embarrass the British at Yorktown, determines to prevent southern aid from reaching the beleaguered Lt. Gen. Charles, Lord Cornwallis. Contingents under generals Marion and Pickens, and lieutenant colonels Henry Lee, William Washington, Henry Hampton, among other South Carolina leaders are called together, and many units from other states join them.

One has to understand the condition of these 2,080 poorly-equipped, underfed, and near-naked Americans camp on September 7 th on the Congaree River Road at Burdell’s Tavern, only seven miles from Eutaw Springs. While the strategy for the ensuing attack is accredited to the genius of the dreaded “Swamp Fox,” Brig. Gen. Francis Marion, who knows every foot of the Santee swamps and river, it is no cake-walk as the patriots have been worn down enough that disciple can and will most likely break down during this battle.

Lt. Col. Alexander Stewart, a 40 year old Scot with a high opinion of himself, was caught off-guard by the proximity of 2000 patriot forces and even disbelieved a couple of patriot deserters who showed up in camp and proclaimed that a force of several thousand was near. Stewart did however dispatch a cavalry commander to check and he ran into the patriots only two miles away, engaged them and was overwhelmed and escaped to make it back to report to Stewart.

Marion and Greene then used the “Cowpens-model” by having militia (one-third of his total force present) at the center and cavalry on the flank with solid troops and by 9am 08SEP1781, the battle was green-lighted.

It should be noted that Stewart had no Hessians with him on this day and offered a single line on the other side of the battle field. Marion’s men advanced surging with Pickens’ and Henderson’s men on their left they continued to fire volley after volley, SEVENTEEN in all, a testament to the character of men Marion had formed.

The NC militia quit the field after only three rounds and left a hole in the middle (“the line is faltering”) which then encouraged the Brits to use a bayonet charge just when Greene’s seasoned Maryland and Virginia Continentals surged themselves with a bayonet charge to give the Brits a taste of their own medicine. This was the first and only time seasoned Brit troops were in full retreat back to their camp.

The rout pushed the point of the battle back 300 yards to a garden area adjacent to a brick house that the Brits used as a defensive line of last resort. The left flank of the patriots had the British commander Maj. John Marjoribanks putting up a devil of a fight and it was the Delaware Continentals, the cream of the crop for patriot troops drove his forces back to the garden area as well.

Then IT happened. The condition of these men and the heat of the region and of the day all factored in what happened next.

Greene’s troops, who had been “rummed-up” prior to the battle located the British alcohol in camp and decided to quench their thirst in the 90 degree SC sun. It was here that the patriots lost all their cannon and experienced a British counterattack.

So after four hours of fighting, Greene ordered a retreat. While many believe that this was a defeat for the patriots, what is known is that:

  • The British did not hold the field but were driven back to their camp
  • Stewart left 70 wounded men and his dead buried behind
  • Greene buried BOTH sides dead and cared for the enemy’s wounded
  • Strategically, the British decided to fall back to Charlestown.

This was great news for South Carolina but in no way did it mean the war was done. The British Empire at this moment of time could have had Cornwallis return to South Carolina to almost start all over again as the British had resources, but not possibly the will, they could pull from their global footprint.

At this point Marion and Greene were still in the mode of anxious anticipation of the next British move.

Stay tuned!

-SF1

JUL1781: Dog Days (Campaign) are a Real Thing in South Carolina in the Summertime

In my last update on the slow attrition of British forces in South Carolina the summer of 1781 as well as the condition of the American Continentals:

Summer fighting in South Carolina requires a lot of a man should he come from Virginia or further north. Greene concluded that the American forces were weakened by the heat and could not survive on the rice in the region and needed bread again. With no beef they resorted to frogs and alligators, because they taste like chicken.

After the next encounter in July 1781, Greene would then moved his troops to the High Hills of the Santee for the rest of the summer.

To recap quickly, Georgetown and Ninety-Six had fallen and so two significant outposts remained slightly inland, Monck’s Corner 30 miles north of Charleston and Dorchester 20 miles northwest of Charleston.The only other occupied outpost is Ninety-Six which has a Loyalist contingent in place there many miles away from the action down state.

The British army was basically in Charleston, in these outposts, and then just one regular British army in the field at Orangeburg. Sumter convinced Greene that he should take out the two outposts cutting off the Brit army in Orangeburg from Charleston, using Lee’s and Marion’s forces of course. Greene’s objective was then to get the Brits stuck on the coast in a land siege and then pray the French Navy could bottle them up in Charleston.

05JUL1781: American Continental leader Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene orders Brig. Gen. Francis Marion and his militia to march from Ancrum’s Plantation towards Moncks Corner in an attempt to cut off Lord Rawdon who is in the field at Orangeburg.  Marion and his men passes around Lord Rawdon, whose troops are sick, exhausted, and almost mutinous and goes in the direction of Moncks Corners and the British forces that are in route to Orangeburg.

08JUL1781: At “o’dark thirty”, Marion quietly breaks camp
and begins moving stealthily down the highway between Orangeburgh
and Moncks Corner looking for Lt. Col. Alexander Stewart and his forces. They pass each other as they took different roads and so at daylight, Marion learns of this mistake and sends Lt. Col. Peter Horry back to pursue Stewart but it is too late. Marion gets word to return to Ancrum’s Plantation where Greene finally has almost all of his army with him at one location – Sumter, Marion, Washington, and Lee. Pickens is the only SC Brigadier General not there.

12JUL1781: July 12th marks the day that Marion followed his orders and took his 180 man force to Moncks Corner while Lee and his 150 man force moved on Dorchester. Sumter remained in the rear with his 200 infantry and one six-pounder.

Marion’s force had just went through some leadership changes with Hugh Giles retiring, a 27 year old John Ervin taking his place and Greene’s commissioning of Peter Horry and Hezekiah Maham to lead two dragoon forces within the Continental Army which meant signing on for one year. Complicating the matter was that both promotions were dated the same day, and if that was not enough, it was never made clear as to who they really reported to .. Greene OR Marion. This was never made clear and made for issues down the road from this day.

The target Greene had in sight at Moncks Corner was a British force of 500-600 redcoats from 19th Regiment of Foot was led by Lt. Col James Coates which had two field howitzers. In addition to this force were 100-150 provincial cavalry under Major Fraser (SC Royalists) which were remnant forces from SC Rangers and Queen’s Rangers, all native SC men who knew the back-country as well as Marion and Sumter.

16JUL1781: Sumter wanted to surround Coates cutting off his escape routes and any reinforcements from Orangeburg. Lee easily pushed the British out of Dorchester and so upon hearing this Coates surprises the patriots by moving five miles northeast to St. James Goose Creek Church which is locally called Biggin Church (a structure with three foot thick walls and where Marion himself worshiped as a boy). As the patriots adjusted to Coates new position, Maham’s dragoons were sent to destroy Wadboo bridge so Coates would not have an easy time getting to Charleston, unfortunately, Coates men were able to repair if overnight and were all set to escape down the Cooper River if and when they needed to.

17JUL1781: With insignificant skirmishing on July 16th at 4am the next morning the Biggin Church was ablaze and Coates had a head start toward Charleston. As the patriots chased Coates they found the Wadboo bridge had been destroyed by the British this time, and so they had to ford the river farther upstream wasting valuable time.

The Brits then went 18 miles south and settled briefly at a vacant plantation of patriot Col. Thomas Shubrick. They posted a howitzer at Quinby Bridge to guard the crossing and started tearing up the planks when Lee, Wade Hampton and some of Marion’s cavalry arrived. Some of the men crossed the creek and started their assault on the British forces, Lee himself chose not to send his cavalry across the 20-yard wide creek due to the muddy bottom. On the other side there was a causeway that led to deadly hand-to-hand combat. Many of the green recruits of the 19th Foot threw down their weapons and fled only to realize how few patriots made is across the creek. The Brits were able to fight their way back to the plantation for cover. Fraser’s Brit cavalry left for Charleston for reinforcements.

Lee and Marion saw the plantation to well fortified and chose to wait for Sumter and his six-pounder. When Sumter arrived WITHOUT his cannon he decided to attack anyway against Lee and Marion’s advice. Marion’s men had to advance across open field and then finding Taylor’s men facing a bayonet charge (NOTE: there are no bayonets on patriot rifles) diverted on an oblique to save Taylor and his men but took a lot of causalities. Forty minute battle was finally called off by Sumter whose troops as well as Lee’s remained in reserve. Fifty killed or wounded, mainly from Marion’s men was the result.

Reflection time: What does one do when a superior, errr, I mean a higher ranking officer gives an ill-advised order? Well the obedient will “just follow orders”, however, the militia volunteers will never forget!

Taylor let it be known that he would not fight alongside the Gamecock Sumter again, putting his men at risk for a poor objective and with no backup. From J.D. Lewis’s “Evolution of Marion’s Brigade after the Fall of Charlestown 1780 to 1782“:

.. Maj. John Baxter is knocked from his horse by a musket ball. He shouts to Lt. Col. Peter Horry, “I am wounded, colonel.” Horry replies, “Think no more of it, Baxter, but stand to your post.”

Baxter shouts, “But I can’t stand, I am wounded a second time!” Horry shoots back, “Lie down then, Baxter, but quit not your post.”

Baxter is hit a third time and says, “They have shot me again, colonel, and if I stay any longer here, I shall be shot to pieces.” Horry then says, “Be it so, Baxter, but stir not.”

Baxter obeys, but he was hit a fourth time.

Fifty of Brig. Gen. Marion’s men are killed or wounded in this assault.  Col. Thomas Taylor finds Brig. Gen. Sumter “sitting cooly under the shade of a tree.” He says, “Sir, I don’t know why you sent me forward on a forlorn hope, promising to sustain me and failed to do so, unless you designed to sacrifice me. I will never serve a single hour under you,” and then retires from Brig. Gen. Thomas Sumter’s command.

There is no post battle comments are on record from Marion to Sumter but to Greene he implied that he too was sent on a fools errand. Most evident of Marion’s true feelings was that he and Lee left the night of the battle and went 15 miles away to camp without informing Sumter. All but 100 of Marion’s men left at this point and Marion internally knew he was done with Sumter.

Within a month, things would change in the leadership of the South Carolina state militias yet again.

Stay tuned for what the conclusion of the “Dog Days Campaign”, what was won and what was lost.

-SF1