Tag: Lord Cornwallis

28SEP1781: Siege at Yorktown Begins – Thank the FRENCH/SPANISH Strategists! Peak Liberty Achieved!

Capt. Francisco Saavedra de Sangronis, Spain’s New World Forces strategist

Popular history lavishes praise on George Washington for cornering the British at Yorktown and having the French navy arrive to bottle them up. While the French allowed this myth to prevail, probably due to Washington’s ego (anyone who has really researched GW knows how fragile his ego was), the truth needs to emerge.

This does not take away the accomplishments of George Washington, as he tactically delayed a British victory in the northern colonies for years, but appreciation for French involvement is necessary to understand the true context of this conflict, which was only a minor part of the global conflict going on in 1781 between the British Empire, and the French with their allies, the Spanish.

It needs to be noted that it is at this time in this republic’s history that Americans were the most free. As noted by Albert Nock in the 1930s in his epic book called “Our Enemy, the State” he says:

When political independence was secured, the stark doctrine of the Declaration went into abeyance, with only a distorted simulacrum of its principles surviving.

This is the sad reality. The abandonment of the Articles of Confederation towards the adoption of the US Constitution only accelerated the move AWAY from liberty and freedom. Albert Nock continues:

As well as one can put a date to such an event, the surrender at Yorktown marks the sudden and complete disappearance of the Declaration’s doctrine from the political consciousness of America. Mr. Jefferson resided in Paris as minister to France from 1784 to 1789. As the time for his return to America drew near, he wrote Colonel Humphreys that he hoped soon “to possess myself anew, by conversation with my countrymen, of their spirit and ideas. I know only the Americans of the year 1784. They tell me this is to be much a stranger to those of 1789.” So indeed he found it. On arriving in New York and resuming his place in the social life of the country, he was greatly depressed by the discovery that the principles of the Declaration had gone wholly by the board. No one spoke of natural rights and popular sovereignty; it would seem actually that no one had ever heard of them. On the contrary, everyone was talking about the pressing need of a strong central coercive authority, able to check the incursions which “the democratic spirit” was likely to incite upon “the men of principle and property.”

The American Revolution was effectively hijacked by other interests. We have seen that in recent times as well with that of the Tea Party and other freedom movements that are infiltrated by those who are not friends of liberty and freedom but place their hope in the state.

But I digress.

On this anniversary of the beginning of the siege of Yorktown toward being a French-American victory started 238 years ago today, I should probably share some truths about the events leading up to this battle.

Gen. George Washington’s personnel and persistent dreams was to knock out the British forces in New York City with the French navy’s assistance. A pretty good article from the Daily Beast (please pardon all the advertisements) outlines the behind the scenes military and political maneuvering that preceded this strategic decision.

The Franco-American alliance was more than two years old, in July 1780, when the Rochambeau-led Expédition Particulière arrived in Rhode Island with 5,500 troops, some long-range cannon, and a relatively small fleet. The alliance had already had two large military disasters, at Newport in 1778 and at Savannah in 1779. Rochambeau wasn’t sure what he could accomplish either, having been forced to leave behind a good chunk of his army and ships, and being burdened with a set of instructions from Louis XVI, dictated by Lafayette, that in unequivocal language put him under the command of General Washington and made the French troops and ships no more than auxiliaries of the Americans.

There was not much hope at this point in the arrangement. As will be seen, George Washington ended up being one of the most challenging roadblocks toward a decisive victory over the British:

Washington had dreamed of this moment, and of having naval superiority over Great Britain. He had long believed that the only way to end the war was to capture a significant British stronghold and army, and for several years he had been fixated on New York as the most likely target for such an attack. Now, with the French fleet, it could be achieved! But to Rochambeau, an attack on New York seemed difficult and dangerous, as likely to end in the capture of his and Washington’s armies as in the capture of British commander Henry Clinton’s. In Rochambeau’s view, he didn’t have enough ships and men to assure himself and Washington of victory.

When one researches Washington’s life, one will see the many times he wished things to be true that only ended up in disaster. In fact, as a young British officer, his decisions led directly to the start of the French-Indian War. His surprise breakfast massacre of French troops, whom he was to “meet up with and negotiate with” in the Appalachian mountains, led to a war that ended up raising taxes in the colonies that started a revolution.

Again, I digress. Back to the decision on Yorktown vs. NYC.

Washington and Rochambeau first met in Hartford on Sept. 20, 1780, at the home of Washington’s former commissary general and longtime supporter, Jeremiah Wadsworth. To this conference, Washington brought an eight-page plan for the attack on New York. Rochambeau came with a neatly written series of 10 questions, with space on the sheets to record Washington’s answers.

The French queries were an elegant, Socratic trap. By answering the first one honestly, Washington would be led, inexorably and through his own logic, to the only possible conclusion, the one chosen ahead of time by Rochambeau.

So Washington was asked whether naval superiority was essential to a big victory over a target defended by the British Navy. When he responded truthfully, “There can be no decisive enterprise against the maritime establishments of the English in this country, without a constant naval superiority,” his fate was sealed because the French fleet was not yet strong enough.

Washington was being played, but for his and the 13 colony’s own good. The French knew the big picture, the global paradigm and GW was myopic in focusing on only brute force to displace the British from NYC.

After the 10 questions had been answered, Rochambeau insisted that there would be no attack on New York in 1780, and none until Louis XVI dispatched more troops and a larger fleet to America. And he was able to induce Washington to co-sign a letter to the king to that effect. It was the only real product of the conference.

That the French were content with this meant that their focus was on the global situation. They were well aware of their own resourcing issues, and rightly so, they had to protect their own interests first. Nations and empires that want to survive need to know how to hold them, know how to fold them, know when to walk away and know when to run (from the military strategist Kenny Rogers).

Eight months later, on May 21, 1781, came the Washington-Rochambeau conference at Wethersfield. In American lore, this is where and when the leaders jointly decided to attack Yorktown. But that’s a myth.

This myth is the key point in all the state approved history books that have been printed in the last couple centuries in the United States. There is nothing you can trust in these books until you have done your own research. The state is convinced that that effort is so labor intensive, the most people will just adopt the history book’s contents as true, because it is easier and it fits the narrative. Happy slave, happy life.

Rochambeau asked: If and when the new and larger French fleet arrived from the Caribbean, “What are the operations that we might have to view at that Epocha?”

Washington’s response: “Should the West India Fleet arrive upon this Coast—the force thus Combined may either proceed in operation against New York, or may be directed against the enemy in some other quarter, as circumstance may dictate.”

Still NYC-centric .. even the next day after a night’s reflections:

The next day, Washington rote in his diary that he had “Fixed with Count Rochambeau” to proceed with a campaign against New York, to begin once the French had transferred to the Hudson River to join his Continentals. He added, almost as an afterthought, that he had agreed to “extend our views Southward as circumstances and a naval superiority might render more necessary & eligible.”

Washington was not budging. This was his fight, it was his terms, and Rochambeau was technically reporting to Gen. George Washington!

Maybe we should shift toward looking into the real strategist’s mind, that of Rochambeau:

In late July, when Rochambeau did move to the Hudson River, just below Peekskill, where his forces encamped next to Washington’s, the French left behind in Rhode Island the resident fleet and the largest of the cannon, which they believed would be wrecked if dragged over Connecticut’s roads. The cannon would have to be brought by ship to whatever target. To my mind—although no documents say so—the abandoning of the cannon argues that Rochambeau had already decided they would soon be transferred by ship to the Yorktown peninsula.

Actions speak louder than words. The excuse Rochambeau had would have convinced Gen. Washington who at this point was just giddy that maybe this was the year that the French navy would arrive.

Indeed, by mid-July Rochambeau had made a significant end-run around Washington’s cherished objective. He, and his new Newport fleet commander, de Barras, and the French plenipotentiary at Philadelphia, La Luzerne, had all sent word to Admiral François Joseph Paul de Grasse, then in the Caribbean, that the best target in America was the large British force on the relatively exposed Yorktown peninsula, where it could not long survive without naval reinforcement.

Inside the French chain of command, this strategic sharing of information sets the tone for what is about to come. From July to November is peak hurricane season in the Caribbean. This might be good timing to get the French assets (ships, guns and men) out of the Caribbean for an alternative mission.

Around that time, aboard the majestic Ville de Paris at Cap-Français, Haiti, de Grasse was meeting with Captain Francisco de Saavedra, a former theology student who had become Spain’s New World forces strategist. They laid out a two-punch plan for ridding the hemisphere of the British. The first blow would be against Yorktown, the second, once de Grasse had returned to the Caribbean and in conjunction with the Spanish fleet there, would be against Jamaica. To enable de Grasse to depart for northern waters, Saavedra committed the Spanish fleet to act as guardian for the French-controlled islands in the Caribbean. As Saavedra put it in his diary, they “could not waste the most decisive opportunity of the war,” to take the Cornwallis army while it was at its most vulnerable.

Who knew that the decision about Yorktown was actually made in Haiti, with French and Spanish strategists? You don’t read any of that in most US History books now do you?

As de Grasse set out for the Yorktown peninsula, he sent ahead a letter to Rochambeau. Forwarded to the Hudson by de Barras, it reached Rochambeau and Washington on Aug. 14. It said that de Grasse was en route to the Yorktown peninsula, “the spot which seemed to be indicated by you, M. le comte, and by MM Washington de la Luzerne and de Barras as the surest to effect the good which you propose.”

Some sources say that Washington was disappointed but then committed his forces to join in the march to Yorktown. Other sources say that Washington lashed out at this news and then went and pouted for an hour before recomposing himself and getting on with the PLAN, the French Plan. In either case, eventually he came around and supported this plan.

Before Rochambeau and Washington’s armies arrived at Yorktown, the battle was essentially won by de Grasse, whose fleet outmaneuvered the British and then, along with de Barras’s, occupied Chesapeake Bay. That forced the British fleet to return to New York, leaving Cornwallis and his army utterly exposed.

At this point it was just a matter of time in defeating the British forces under Cornwallis at Yorktown since there was no re-supply line afforded them. This was NOT the end of this conflict as both Charleston and NYC would not be evacuated by the British until over a year after the Yorktown victory was secured on 17OCT1781. Peace itself was not secured until the Treaty of Paris was signed on 03SEP1783, almost TWO years after Yorktown!

Now you know.

-SF1

15NOV1780: Georgetown Targeted by Marion’s Militia

 

As a follow-up to my last blog post where Marion’s militia out foxes the undefeated British Legion commander Tarleton, it is apparent that the burning of homes of patriots in the region was Tarleton’s attempt at rattling Marion and his men psychologically and again tempt them to come out in the open to fight. It is essential for the guerrilla commander not to act emotionally but to act strategically and tactfully if they are to keep their forces intact against a larger force, in this case, an empire’s force in North America in the colony of South Carolina.

The lull in Marion’s activities of only a few days gave Tarleton the prideful thought that he had put Marion in his place and therefore used this time to issue a proclamation on 11NOV1780:

“It is not the wish of Britons to be cruel or to destroy, but it is now obvious to all Carolina that treachery, perfidy, and perjury will be punished with instant fire and sword,” his proclamation read. “The country seems now convinced of the error of insurrection,” he boasted to Cornwallis … offering pardons to any rebels who returned to their homes to live peaceably and promised to alert the Tory militia leaders to any future insurrections…

Oller, John. The Swamp Fox: How Francis Marion Saved the American Revolution

Gen. Lord Cornwallis seemed to believe the reports and assumed that Tarleton’s pushing the fox to the swamp would convince the locals, especially those that leaned more patriotic, that “there was a power superior to Marion”. Flush with this euphoric feeling that Marion was marginalized, the British Camden HQ changed their commander on 13NOV1780 as Francis, Lord Rawdon relieved Lt. Col. George Turnbull who had contracted malaria. The next day, 14NOV1780, Lt. Col. Tarleton leaves Camden and heads towards Winnsboro in pursuit of another militia leader, Thomas Sumter.

So with the Sumter distraction towards North Carolina, this allowed Marion to move on Georgetown, the opposite direction from Camden and Tarleton. Marion had received Intel that only 50 wounded soldiers were guarding this port city, key in one of the supply lines to inland British forces and was in need of ammunition, clothing, and salt. Marion was surprised, due to dated Intel, to find that a force of 200 Loyalists under Capt. Jesse Barefield had entered Georgetown to reinforce it. Marion then splits his forces into two separate reconnaissance parties and engage in two skirmishes, one at Allston’s plantation and the other at White’s plantation.

At the White’s plantation, Marion’s militia found civilian cattle being slaughtered. The militia engages this force suffering some losses but also killing the commander of up to 200 men, a Capt. James Lewis.

At Allston’s plantation, two companies of militia (one from SC the other from GA) come upon Capt. Jesse Barefield and his Loyalists forces. Both sides fire at the same time and the Loyalists capture Lt. Gabriel Marion and begin clubbing him with their muskets until he is knocked senseless. A mulatto named Sweat recognizes who he is and he fires a load of buckshot into his heart, killing him instantly.

Lt. Gabriel Marion was Francis’ favorite nephew from his brother Gabriel’s family:

Marion’s horsemen killed a Tory captain and wounded the redoubtable Jesse Barefield on the head and body before he got away. The patriots also took twelve Tory prisoners. But Marion’s men suffered a grievous loss of their own. In the scuffle with Barefield, Marion’s nephew Gabriel Marion, a lieutenant in the brigade, was captured and then shot through the chest at point blank when the Tories learned his identity. Recently turned twenty-one at the time of his death, Gabriel was Marion’s favorite nephew—the son of Marion’s closest and late brother, Gabriel, who had done so much to help Marion financially over the years. … Marion, childless himself, mourned young Gabriel’s death as a father would a son. But his official report of the skirmish was typically laconic: “Our loss was Lt. Gabriel Marion and one private killed and three wounded.” When, the day after the skirmish, one of Marion’s soldiers put a bullet through the head of a captured mulatto man suspected—without evidence—of having killed his nephew, a furious Marion severely reprimanded the captain of the prisoner guard for failing to prevent it.

Oller, John. The Swamp Fox: How Francis Marion Saved the American Revolution

It was in this epic seesaw of an internal civil war in the South Carolina colony that rapid buildup of British forces seem to happen overnight. The same day the skirmishes occurred north of Georgetown,  15Nov1780, that British Lt. Col. Nisbet Balfour sends out 275 men, with two three-pounders from Georgetown towards Kingstree. This force was made up of Provincials, Loyalist Militia and Hessian mercenaries.

Upon returning to camp at Black Mingo on 17NOV1780, Marion writes to his friend Brig. Gen. Henry William Harrington (NC) and relates his
two recent engagements and that his men have less than six rounds of ammunition each. By 21NOV1780, Marion camps along the Pee Dee River near Britton’s Ferry and writes a letter to Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates telling him about the large enemy force now encamped at Kingstree and openly wonders when the Continental Army was planning to return to South Carolina:

“Many of my people has left me and gone over to the enemy, for they think that we have no army coming on, and have been deceived,” he informed Gates. “As we hear nothing from you a great while, I hope to have a line from you in what manner to act, and some assurance to the people of support.” The next day he wrote Gates to reiterate the point. “I seldom have the same [militia] set a fortnight,” he lamented, “and until the Grand Army is on the banks of Santee, it will be the same.”

Oller, John. The Swamp Fox: How Francis Marion Saved the American Revolution

Marion understands that the dynamic nature of his volunteer forces tests his leadership ability and his patience. He appeals to those who could bend the ears of the Continental army leadership that with things still in play in South Carolina, that it might be a good time to take the fight south again, undoubtedly with different leadership then they had back in August in their embarrassing loss to the British at Camden, SC.

Harvest time is drawing to a close, but Francis Marion still has several objectives in mind to keep the pressure on the British so that they have to stay in the Southern Theatre of the Revolutionary war and preserve Gen. George Washington’s stalemate in the north.

Stay tuned ..

-SF1

02NOV1780 – British Lt. Gen Charles, Lord Cornwallis Green Lights Lt. Col. Tarleton

The context for this decision by Corwallis to “green light” Tarleton is essential toward understanding the gravity of this moment in the confederation’s (thirteen colonies joined together for this cause) war for independence from the British Empire.

My previous post showed how Francis Marion’s winning streak was turning society away from leaning toward an inevitable “Loyalist” South Carolina and swelled the ranks of the patriots. From the book “Swamp Fox: How Francis Marion Saved the American Revolution“:

Marion’s victory at Tearcoat Swamp left the British high command in a state of panic. With no effective enemy force in the field, Marion now had the ability to strike at will throughout the entire area of South Carolina east of the Wateree River and north of the Santee.

As a result it had become almost impossible for the British to safely send supplies or communications from the coast to Cornwallis’s army. The Santee, the major navigable river flowing through the heart of the state, did not connect directly to either Georgetown or Charleston. Therefore, to move supplies from the coast to Camden and Winnsboro, it was necessary to use both roads and waterways. Typically the British traveled either overland or by boat to Nelson’s Ferry, where they crossed the Santee, then by wagon to Camden. But because of the threat Marion posed, the British were afraid to cross at Nelson’s and began taking a longer, more circuitous route to the northwest over more difficult roads to Friday’s Ferry on the Congaree River. From there they crossed the Congaree and traveled overland to Camden and Winnsboro.

Desperate times calls for desperate measures apparently. Lord Cornwallis, who prided himself publicly as a man who fought with honor decided to give in to Banastre Tarleton’s pleas to go after the guerrilla militia leader Marion. This was not just Cornwallis granting just any staff officer their desire, it was a calculated move based on Tarleton’s history, character and reputation. Cornwallis was brilliant in strategy, however, it seems that his assumption that American colonial society would quickly forget atrocities (underestimating “blowback”) may well have been one of his weaknesses, along with pride.

From the movie “The Patriot” (2000):

  • Benjamin Martin: I’ve just read into the mind of a genius. Cornwallis knows more about war then any of us could ever hope to learn in a dozen lifetimes. His victories at Camden and Charleston were perfect, perfect. The thing is, he knows that… and perhaps that’s his weakness.
  • Gabriel Martin: Sir?
  • Benjamin Martin: Pride. Pride’s a weakness.
  • Major Jean Villeneuve: Personally, I would prefer stupidity.
  • Benjamin Martin: Pride will do.

Basically, the man Cornwallis chose is the antithesis of Francis Marion. Read the following from John Oller’s words and see for yourself:

Young (twenty-six in 1780), boyishly handsome, athletically built, a drinker, gambler, and womanizer, he cut the sort of dashing figure that some have mistakenly ascribed to Marion. His stock in trade was his ruthless pursuit of his quarry followed by a headlong, frontal cavalry attack, with sabers flashing and slashing when he inevitably caught up with them. Son of a wealthy Liverpool slave-trading merchant, Tarleton attended Oxford and studied law at London’s prestigious Middle Temple before quitting to follow his friend and fellow Oxfordian, Francis Rawdon, into the military.

He purchased a “cornet,” or commission, in the British cavalry in 1775 and voluntarily sailed to America to fight with the king’s men. He was part of Clinton’s first, unsuccessful attack on Charleston, saw action at Brandywine, and helped capture Charles Lee, the Continental commander, in a raid on a tavern in late 1776. During the British occupation of Philadelphia he gambled away his salary, nearly dueled an officer whose mistress he dallied with, ..

Next, let us add in the 1780MAY actions of Tarleton as a follow-up to the British capturing Charlestown:

.. In late May, Cornwallis had dispatched Tarleton and his Legion of 230, along with a company of 40 British army dragoons, to pursue Colonel Abraham Buford. Having arrived too late to reinforce Charleston, Buford and his 350 Virginia Continentals were then on the run toward North Carolina. With them were Governor John Rutledge and some members of his council, who had fled Charleston before it fell.

Although the Americans had a ten-day head start on him, Tarleton drove his men relentlessly forward, covering 150 miles in fifty-four hours to catch up with them. Rutledge barely avoided capture by veering off from the main force hours ahead of the pursuers, but Tarleton overtook Buford just shy of the North Carolina border at a place called the Waxhaws. There, in Tarleton’s own words, “slaughter was commenced.”

Some historians think this is shear propaganda, however, there have been many direct sources that relay some rather harsh orders that this 28 year old gave to his men.  Here is some more detail from the claims that emerged after this event:

The patriot side claimed that after the fighting stopped, Tarleton’s men were guilty of outright massacre, hacking Buford’s men to death even as they lay down their arms and begged for quarter. “Tarleton’s Quarter” (meaning take no prisoners) and “Buford’s Massacre” became rallying cries for the patriots in later battles, notably King’s Mountain. What is sometimes overlooked is that although the commander of the king’s troops at both King’s Mountain and the Waxhaws was a Briton, virtually all the slaughtering was done by Americans against Americans.

This man had no long-term appreciation for what America would be like after his assumption of British subjection of the rebel spirit. This man is very much unlike Francis Marion in almost every way.

In the six months Tarleton had been in the colony of South Carolina, he bested the likes of William Washington, Issac Huger, A. Buford and even Thomas Sumter, all of senior rank to Tarleton. With a reputation like this, Corwallis was hoping for a quick win from someone who could get things done, even if it was done ruthlessly. Cornwallis had already spent more time than he would have liked in this southern colony and was anxious to maneuver north to bring a quick end to this conflict and bring the colonies back under the British wing.

With the “green light”, Tarleton moves out of Winnsboro which is 30 miles west of Camden and will take several days ride to arrive in the area Marion and his militia might be. Tarleton will be leading what is called a British Legion, which is actually a loyalist cavalry (American Tories) unit that was recruited from both New York and Pennsylvania. Legions consisted of traditional saber carrying cavalry and dragoons which are infantry who traveled on horses who had pistols and muskets.  Tarleton’s men wore green coats to set them from the redcoat British regulars.

The hunt is on, for this “fox” that has interrupted British operations in the region.

Stay tuned.

-SF1

 

August 16, 1780 – British Empire vs. Continentals/Militia : Battle of Camden

The darkest hour of the War for Independence from the British Empire in South Carolina was on this day 238 years ago. As mentioned in my previous post, the 4000 Continentals led by Horatio Gates, hero of Saratoga, and Major General Johann DeKalb faced Lord Cornwallis and Lt. Colonel James Webster and other British leadership on the fields just south and west of present day DeKalb, SC which is north and west of Camden, SC.  More in depth information on the Battle of Camden can be researched here.

The mismatch in the troops was apparent from the first shots as volunteers from Virginia were ordered to march within 50 yards of the British and hesitated at that command. Facing the best of the British army, the 23rd and 33rd regiments, is an unnerving experience. The Virginians saw the expertise being aimed at them and broke. The ripple effect of this continued past the Virginia militia, to the North Carolina militia and even to the Maryland Continentals.

This alone was all it took to have Major General Horatio Gates mount a fast horse and ride hard and long for 60 miles, about 2-3 hours, leaving any further damage control and subsequent retreat to other officers on the field.

The 1st Maryland Brigade put up a heroic fight against the British as things were coming apart at the seams, keeping this event from being a rout. This delay helped other units on the field but ultimately the troops had to flee into the nearby swamps that kept Lt. Colonel Banastre Tarleton’s horse from pursuing them in this terrain allowing them to live to fight another day.

The 2nd Maryland, Delaware Continentals and North Carolina militia (one unit) remained on the field but were outnumbered 600 to 2000. Major General Baron Johann DeKalb led many bayonet charges for over an hour and had his horse shot out from under him.  In his final assault he killed a British soldier and then went down to bayonet and bullet wounds. His troops protectively closed around him and opposed another bayonet charge from the overwhelming British forces.

Lt. Colonel Banastre Tarleton returned from his pursuit of the 1st Maryland in the swamps and chased the rear of the balance of the American troops. This battle was over.

The type of warfare typical to the 18th Century had Lord Cornwallis taking Baron DeKalb back to Camden and had him seen by his personal physician. Unfortunately Baron DeKalb died in Camden and is buried in Camden with a monument that has been erected to his memory on the old battlefield.

The final tally was about 700 American troops killed or taken prisoner out of 3000 troops that actually engaged in fighting, that Gates had abandoned, while the British lost 300 troops who were wounded or killed (68) out of 2200 engaged in this fight.

This fight effectively left a huge power vacuum in South Carolina that would take the Americans months to recover from. It is into this vacuum that men like Francis Marion would step up and into for the cause they had on their hearts.

August 1780 was a time when men of this region had to put into action, the words they had on their lips for the previous four years. Effectively, the resulted in an internal civil war in South Carolina. The method that men chose to fight would be known for generations to come and the legacy of the Swamp Fox would be born.

August 10, 1780 – British Lt. Gen. Lord Cornwallis Leaves Charleston for South Carolina Interior

Francis Marion’s area of Operations August 1780

2nd Regiment of the South Carolina militia

As a follow-up to my earlier post: http://seekingliberty.org/2018/07/26/july-1780-continentals-attempt-quick-victory-against-british-in-south-carolina/

… August 1780 is a very busy and transitional month in the colony of South Carolina:

10AUG1780: While the British make their way into the interior of this colony, Gov. John Rutledge authorizes Francis Marion to take command of the militia east of the Santee River. So the question now is, does Francis Marion become a Colonel of the militia or is he still a Lt. Col. in the Continental organization?

12AUG1780: Lord Cornwallis’ forces cross the Santee at Nelson’s Ferry and arrive at Camden on the 13th of August making quick work at moving inland with no real resistance.

15AUG1780: Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates storms into South Carolina and orders Francis Marion and his men to seize all the boats along the Santee River. This group of militia then moves away from the Continental Army north of Camden (Rugeley’s Mill) to the west side of Camden opposite the British army on the other side of the Wateree River.  The next day’s events would unfold without the aid of any South Carolina militia groups as Gates and the Continentals think they have this under control.

Stay tuned .. 16AUG1780 is a day that will set the tone for the rest of this war.