Swamp Fox Research Hub

One of the most ridiculous claims I have ever heard is that the South left the North over slavery. Anyone with a thinking mind should have done their research and realize that when the media/government spins a yarn so very hard and for over a century, it is probably false.

In reading a 1960s well documented book by Murray Rothbard called “Conceived in Liberty, Volume 5: The New Republic”, it becomes apparent that the new “marriage” of several colonial regions in America had some high hopes and dreams that were quickly dashed with some harsh realities. Promises made or implied give away to a selfish attitude that neatly translates for the North into some more economic bondage for the South.

This core resentment and distrust would eventually be the key reason why the South (as of 04MAR1861, just the seven states of the deep south) did not flinch when Lincoln promised them LEGAL and PERMANENT slavery of blacks IF they would simply re-enter the Union. By this time the South was tired of the abusive relationship the North treated them with and it was apparent that as of NOV1860 that the North could elect a president without ANY Southern support or votes spoke volumes.

As the American Revolution ended in 1783 with the Treaty of Paris, the engagement of the thirteen colonies signed 04JUL1776 with the Declaration of Independence led to the creation of the wedding vows on 15NOV1777 followed by the commencement of the marriage on 01MAR1781. Note that the language of the vows talks of a perpetual union, however, by the time a constitutional convention was called in 1787, these original vows were discarded for a new set (the United States Constitution) that “promised” a better relationship. In hindsight, it was all downhill from that point forward.

With the end of the war-period in which these thirteen colonies fought together, but with a wide range of sacrifice, it was time to settle all the debt incurred during this period. It is in this period that some significant character flaws started to make themselves known that should have been red-flags, especially for the South, to anticipate what a continued relationship might look like and if the North could be trusted in the long-term.

Murray Rothbard shares a summary:

“A key to the politico-economic problems of the Confederation period, as well as one of the leading arguments for centralized power, was the swollen corpus of war-born public debt. The mass of federal and state debt could have depreciated and passed out of existence by the end of the war, but the process was stopped by Robert Morris. Morris and the nationalists moved to make the depreciated federal debt ultimately redeemable at par, and also agitated for federal assumption of the states’ debts. This was done to benefit speculators who purchased the public debt at depreciated values and to force a drive for a national taxing power ..”

To have a “spouse” like that to hijack the relationship towards a future that philosophically was repulsive to the independent minded Southern colonies, in effect, USING the South for it’s economic engine (which at that time was much more healthy than the North, this in spite of the major conflicts that occurred in the South during the last 1/2 of the war).

As a result of the nationalists’ efforts to assume the public debt, the value of the public debt, in specie, increased from $11 million in 1780 to $27 million in 1783, the vast bulk of which was held in the northern states. While scrambling to assume some of the debt themselves, the states had also amassed a huge burden of their own debt. Thus, by the end of the war, Massachusetts’ total debt was nearly £1.5 million; Rhode Island, about $0.5 million; Connecticut, over $3.75 million; Pennsylvania, over £4.6 million; Virginia’s over £4.25 million. As a result, payment of interest on the debt amounted to an overwhelming proportion of the state budget, and one estimate is that 50–90 percent of state expenditures went for this purpose ..

Not cool. The elites looked to benefiting themselves and placing the common folk on the hook for all the taxes needed not just to satisfy the interest payments on the debt, but to eventually pay off all the American Revolutionary War debt,

One problem that bitterly divided the states during the Confederation period was the settlement of common accounts. Under the Articles, expenses made by the several states for causes common to them all would be lumped together as “common charges” and the charges paid proportionately by the various states. In short, “debtor” states would pay their share to claimant “creditor” states through Congress and thus settle their accounts. Wartime expenses were clearly a common charge for the general welfare, and therefore those states which had expended more in the war effort (notably the southern states, because of the nature of the last few years of the war) were entitled to payment from the others. Logically, the public debt incurred by Congress should also have been assumed pro rata by the separate states, but the nationalists’ fierce determination to amass and retain a federal debt was able to keep that debt a federal rather than a “common” charge.

Talk about a bait and switch. So the vows that were agreed to in 1781 were just words on paper and the actions after the war’s end were highly dishonorable in regards to the nationalist’s agenda:

Throughout the 1780s the southern states tried to obtain their just settlements, but the northern states faithlessly fell back on technicalities, lack of official vouchers and authorization, etc., to keep the southern states from their just due. Also the South in particular had gone much further than other states in assuming unliquidated federal debt during the war (e.g., Quartermaster and Commissary certificates) and had exchanged them for state debts, only to find Congress (i.e., the North) balking about accepting these federal certificates as evidence for expenditures in the common welfare. Again, the North was depriving the South of their just due.

It should be noted that many Southern militia members never got the pensions deserved and yet so many New Englanders who never fought a battle received the same pension. Basically, the Yankee’s word meant nothing, and this was only the beginning:

As the dispute dragged on during the decade with the southern states unable to redeem their claims, Robert Morris’ wily “solution” proposed in 1783 began to look better to all concerned. An ultra-nationalist’s dream, the proposal was to accept all southern claims without cavil, but not to be paid by the debtor states: to be assumed by the federal government, which would issue federal securities for all claims. In short, the federal government would assume all war-born state debts. The tax-and-debt burdens of the states were, of course, aggravated when the depression of 1784 hit the country, for now a fixed sum of taxes and debt payments had to be exacted from a depressed economy in which prices were generally lower and therefore the real tax burden greater. One critical problem was whether the debt would be paid at its depreciated market value, which at least reflected current economic realities, or whether the state would insist on paying them at their far greater face value, and thus impose an enormously greater tax burden upon the people. The anger of people at paying debt charges was considerably aggravated by the fact that the bulk of this debt had passed from its original owners at highly depreciated amounts into the hands of speculators. Payment of face value, then, would not even benefit the original public creditors; in fact, they too would suffer from being taxed for the benefit of a windfall to a comparative handful of speculators in the public debt.

The way two former colonies would handle this situation showed the difference in character between the regions, which to me meant that they were not compatible for a “tight” marriage but might work in a loose “federation”. Unfortunately, the actions in 1787 with the new “vows” (the US Constitution, coup d’tat) would make this marriage so tight that it could only become abusive in the long haul.

Virginia showed honorable character:

Virginia was sensible enough to pay much of the debt at its depreciated market value, and make its taxes to pay the debt payable in depreciated certificates. Hence, Virginia was able to reduce its debt rapidly and without imposing enormous burdens on its taxpayers .. Numerous county petitions in Virginia pleaded the impossibility of paying taxes, a condition aggravated by the low price of tobacco in the mid-1780s. The Virginia legislature reacted sagely to the protests .. and agreed to lower or suspend taxes, and to allow hemp-growing western farmers to pay their taxes in hemp or flour. Indeed, Virginia agreed, in the spring of 1784, to suspend all tax collections for six months, and then agreed to cut taxes in half for the year 1785.

Massachusetts not so much:

Massachusetts, on the other hand, so handled its debt during the war as to benefit its debt holders and speculators, consolidating its debt by 1784 at twice its market value. To pay this particularly large debt, Massachusetts levied enormous taxes and insisted on collecting them in specie. This is not surprising, since the Massachusetts government was basically run by the very groups that owned the great mass of state debt. The debt burden was borne particularly by the poor, since roughly 33 to 40 percent of Massachusetts’ state revenue was raised by poll taxes, which were equal for each citizen. As a result, it is estimated that at least a third of a Massachusetts farmer’s income after 1780 was extracted from him in taxes, and in specie at that. Farmers and the poor demanded that the state debt at least be scaled down to market value, but the conservative ruling groups angrily refused. Typical of the eastern mercantile oppression over the mass of citizens and farmers was the imposition of excise taxes, which harmed the bulk of consumers. Thus, the tax on spirits (e.g., cider brandy) distilled from one’s own apple orchard was twice the level of the tax on New England rum: a clear privilege to the Boston and other eastern merchants over the western farmers. Tax oppression upon the Massachusetts people was enormous, and the courts ruthlessly threw those who could not pay into jail. Tax defaulters’ property was seized, but in the time-honored way of neighborhood solidarity, local mobs prevented anyone but the owner from bidding for the property.

The rifts were real and would be aggravated over time.  These events should have given caution to the southern states by the late 1780s that had the nationalists accelerate their efforts to centralize the US general government and create a central bank. It seems the longer the South stayed with the North the more the North sensed that it OWNED the South, as a slave and not respected her as a spouse.

Hindsight is indeed 20/20 .. but learning these things from real history is priceless!

-SF1