Democracy – The God That Failed: Teaser Quotes

[Written December 2017]

Having picked up (not literally, just looked at my dozens of Kindle books and decided which one of my partially completed books I would like to read this beautiful December morning) this book I discovered I had already highlighted some great quotes in the middle of this thirteen chapter book.

After reading a page .. and then another page, and another page and sharing with a couple of my sons I finally came to the conclusion that I MUST eventually review this book as it does render much insight into the broken nature of our “democracy” (a word that Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson rightfully hated because it was so destructive to a people/nation/country).

So .. in no particular order .. here are some quotes from Hans that sparked my interest (followed by a couple images of quotes from Franklin and Jefferson and even one from Marx that drive this point home) :

“… Thus, privilege and legal discrimination — and the distinction between rulers and subjects — do not disappear under democracy. To the contrary. Rather than being restricted to princes and nobles, under democracy, privileges come into the reach of everyone: Everyone can participate in theft and live off stolen loot if only he becomes a public official. Likewise, democratically elected parliaments are, just like any absolute or constitutional king, not bound by any superior, natural law, i.e., by law not of their own making (such as and including so-called constitutional law), but they can legislate, i.e., they can make and change laws. Only: While a king legislates in his own favor, under democracy everyone is free to promote and try to put into effect legislation in his own favor, provided only that he finds entry into parliament or government…”

“Theoretically speaking, the transition from monarchy to democracy involves no more (or less) than the replacement of a permanent, hereditary monopoly “owner” — the king — by temporary and interchangeable “caretakers” — by presidents, prime ministers, and members of parliament. Both, kings and presidents, will produce “bads,” i.e., they tax and they legislate. Yet a king, because he “owns” the monopoly and may sell and bequeath his realm to a successor of his choosing, his heir, will care about the repercussions of his actions on capital values. As the owner of the capital stock on “his” territory, the king will be comparatively future-oriented. In order to preserve or enhance the value of his property, his exploitation will be comparatively moderate and calculating. In contrast, a temporary and interchangeable democratic caretaker does not own the country, but as long as he is in office he is permitted to use it to his own advantage. He owns its current use but not its capital stock. This does not eliminate exploitation. Instead, it makes exploitation shortsighted, present-oriented, and uncalculating, i.e., carried out with no or little regard for the value of the capital stock. In short, it promotes capital consumption.”

“In sharp contrast, the selection of state rulers by means of popular elections makes it essentially impossible for a harmless or decent person to ever rise to the top. Presidents and prime ministers come into their position not owing to their status as natural aristocrats, as feudal kings once did, i.e., based on the recognition of their economic independence, outstanding professional achievement, morally impeccable personal life, wisdom and superior judgment and taste, but as a result of their capacity as morally uninhibited demagogues. Hence, democracy virtually assures that only dangerous men will rise to the top of state government.”

This last quote shows how easy it is for the SWAMP to grow .. the fact is, this swamp started growing even before the thirteen sovereign colonies emerged from the American Revolution / secession from the British Empire in 1783 when the Treaty of Paris was signed.

In this next rather large clip is the reason a society’s character changes as a natural result of democracies:

“Worse: Under democracy the social character and personality structure of the entire population will be changed systematically. All of society will be thoroughly politicized. During the monarchical age, the ancient aristocratic order had still remained somewhat intact. Only the king and, indirectly, the members of his (exclusive) court could enrich themselves — by means of taxation and legislation — at other people’s and their properties expense. Everyone else had to stand on his own feet, so to say, and owed his position in society, his wealth and his income, to some sort of value-productive efforts. Under democracy, the incentive structure is systematically changed. Egalitarian sentiments and envy are given free reign. Everyone, not just the king, is now allowed to participate in the exploitation — via legislation or taxation — of everyone else. Everyone is free to express any confiscatory demands whatsoever. Nothing, no demand, is off limits. In Bastiat’s words, under democracy the State becomes the great fiction by which everyone seeks to live at the expense of everyone else. Every person and his personal property come within reach of and are up for grabs by everyone else. Under a one-man-one-vote regime, then, a relentless machinery of wealth and income redistribution is set in motion. It must be expected that majorities of have-nots will constantly try to enrich themselves at the expense of minorities of haves. This is not to say that there will be only one class of haves and one class of have-nots, the rich and the poor, and that the redistribution — via taxation and legislation — will occur uniformly from the rich onto the poor. To the contrary. While the redistribution from rich to poor will always play a prominent role and is indeed a permanent feature and mainstay of democracy, it would be naïve to assume that it will be the sole or even the predominant form of redistribution. After all, the rich and the poor are usually rich or poor for a reason. The rich are characteristically bright and industrious, and the poor typically dull, lazy or both. It is not very likely that dullards, even if they make up a majority, will systematically outsmart and enrich themselves at the expense of a minority of bright and energetic individuals. Rather, most redistribution will take place within the group of the non-poor, and it will actually be frequently the better off who succeed in having themselves subsidized by the poor. (Just think of “free” university education, whereby the working class, whose children rarely attend universities, pay for the education of middle-class children!) Indeed, many competing parties and coalitions will try to gain at the expense of others. In addition, there will be a variety of changing criteria defining what it is that makes a person a have (deserving to be looted) and another a have-not (deserving to receive the loot) — and it will be the intellectuals who play a major role in defining and promoting these criteria (making sure, of course, that they themselves will always be classified as have-nots in need of ever more loot). As well, individuals can be members of a multitude of groups of haves or have-nots, losing on account of one characteristic and gaining on account of another, with some individuals ending up net-losers and others net-winners of redistribution. In any case, however, since it is invariably something valuable, something “good” that is being redistributed — property and income — of which the haves supposedly have too much and the have-nots too little, any redistribution implies that the incentive to beget, have, or produce something of value — something “good” — is systematically reduced and, mutatis mutandis, the incentive of not getting, having, or producing anything valuable — of not being or not having anything “good” — but relying instead on and living off redistributed income and wealth is systematically increased. In short, the proportion of good people and good, value-productive activities is reduced and the proportion of bad or not-so-good people and of unproductive habits, character traits, and types of conduct will increase, with the overall result of impoverishing society and making life increasingly unpleasant. While it is impossible to predict the exact outcome of the permanent democratic struggle of all against all, except to say that it will lead to ever higher taxes, to a never ending flood of legislation and thus increased legal uncertainty, and consequently to an increase in the rate of social time-preference, i.e., increased short-term orientation (an “infantilization” of society), one outcome of this struggle, one result of democracy can be safely predicted, however. Democracy produces and brings about a new power elite or ruling class. Presidents, prime ministers, and the leaders of parliament and political parties are part of this power elite, and I have already talked about them as essentially amoral demagogues. But it would be naïve to assume that they are the most powerful and influential people of all. They are more frequently only the agents and delegates — those doing the bidding — of other people standing on the sidelines and out of public view. The true power elite, which determines and controls who will make it as president, prime minister, party leader, etc., are the plutocrats. The plutocrats, as defined by the great but largely forgotten American sociologist William Graham Sumner, are not simply the super-rich — the big bankers and the captains of big business and industry. Rather, the plutocrats are only a subclass of the super rich. They are those super rich big bankers and businessmen, who have realized the enormous potential of the State as an institution that can tax and legislate for their own even greater future enrichment and who, based on this insight, have decided to throw themselves into politics. They realize that the State can make you far richer than you already are: whether in subsidizing you, in awarding you with state contracts, or in passing laws that protect you from unwelcome competition or competitors, and they decide to use their riches to capture the State and use politics as a means to the end of their own further enrichment (rather than becoming richer solely by economic means, i.e., in better serving voluntarily paying customers of one’s products). They do not have to get involved in politics themselves. They have more important and lucrative things to do than wasting their time with everyday politics. But they have the cash and the position to “buy” the typically far less affluent professional politicians, either directly in paying them bribes or indirectly, by agreeing to employ them later on, after their stint in professional politics, as highly paid managers, consultants, or lobbyists, and so manage to decisively influence and determine the course of politics in their own favor. They, the plutocrats, will become the ultimate winners in the constant income and wealth redistribution struggle that is democracy. And in between them (the real power elite staying outside the limelight), and all those whose income (and wealth) depends solely or largely on the State and its taxing power (the employees of the always growing state apparatus and all recipients of transfer payments, its “welfare clients”), the productive middle class gets increasingly squeezed dry.”

Finally, here is another clip that shows how total and constant war becomes natural with democracies:

“Not least, democracy has also a profound effect on the conduct of war. I already explained that kings, because they can externalize the cost of their own aggression onto others (via taxes) tend to be more than ‘normally’ aggressive and war-like. However, a king’s motive for war is typically an ownership-inheritance dispute brought on by a complex network of inter-dynastic marriages and the irregular but always recurring extinction of certain dynasties. As violent inheritance disputes, monarchical wars are characterized by limited territorial objectives. They are not ideologically motivated quarrels but disputes over tangible properties. Moreover, as inter-dynastic property disputes, the public considers war essentially the king’s private affair to be paid for by himself and as insufficient reason for any further tax increase. Further, as private conflicts between different ruling families the public expects, and the kings feel compelled, to recognize a clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants and to target their war efforts specifically and exclusively against each other and their respective personal properties. Democracy radically transforms the limited wars of kings into total wars. In blurring the distinction between the rulers and the ruled, democracy strengthens the identification of the public with the State. Once the State is owned by all, as democrats deceivingly propagate, then it is only fair that everyone should fight for their State and all economic resources of the country be mobilized for the State in its wars. And since public officials in charge of a democratic state cannot and do not claim to personally “own” foreign territory (as a king can do), the motive for war instead becomes an ideological one — national glory, democracy, liberty, civilization, humanity. The objectives are intangible and elusive: the victory of ideas, and the unconditional surrender and ideological conversion of the losers (which, because one can never be sure about the sincerity of the conversion, may require the mass murder of civilians). As well, the distinction between combatants and non-combatants becomes fuzzy and ultimately disappears under democracy, and mass war involvement — the draft and popular war rallies — as well as “collateral damage” become part of war strategy. These tendencies will be still further strengthened by the rise of the new ruling elite of plutocrats. For one, the plutocrats will quickly realize the enormous profits to be made by arming the State, by producing the very weapons and equipment used in war, and in being awarded most generous tax-funded cost-plus contracts to do so. A military-industrial complex will be built up. And second, unlike most people who have merely local or domestic interests, the super-rich plutocrats have financial interests also in foreign places, potentially all around the globe, and in order to promote, protect, and enforce these foreign interests it is only natural for them to use the military power of their own State also to interfere, meddle, or intervene in foreign affairs on their behalf. A business deal in foreign countries may have turned sour or a concession or license may be won there — almost everything can be used as a reason to pressure one’s own State to come to their rescue and intervene outside of its own territory. Indeed, even if this intervention requires that a foreign country be destroyed, this can be a boon for them, provided only they receive the contract to rebuild the country that their weapons had before destroyed. Finally, the tendency already set in motion with the war of kings of leading to increased political centralization, toward the building of empire, is continued and accelerated through democratic war.”

Democracy – The God That Failed

Democracy – The God That Failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy and Natural Order (Perspectives on Democratic Practice) – by Hans-Hermann Hoppe

When a book commands $40 for paperback and $440 for hardcover .. you know it is a good one.

Here is a 10 minute YouTube that allows you to listen to Hans describe this book and his intent for writing it: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hUzkZaD1xDs .. this is fascinating!

I plan to share some more quotes and such .. a teaser for y’all to think about buying this book (or searching online for a PDF or something). This is rich!

Here is the Amazon descriptor for this book:

The core of this book is a systematic treatment of the historic transformation of the West from monarchy to democracy. Revisionist in nature, it reaches the conclusion that monarchy is a lesser evil than democracy, but outlines deficiencies in both. Its methodology is axiomatic-deductive, allowing the writer to derive economic and sociological theorems, and then apply them to interpret historical events.

A compelling chapter on time preference describes the progress of civilization as lowering time preferences as capital structure is built, and explains how the interaction between people can lower time all around, with interesting parallels to the Ricardian Law of Association. By focusing on this transformation, the author is able to interpret many historical phenomena, such as rising levels of crime, degeneration of standards of conduct and morality, and the growth of the mega-state. In underscoring the deficiencies of both monarchy and democracy, the author demonstrates how these systems are both inferior to a natural order based on private-property.

Hoppe deconstructs the classical liberal belief in the possibility of limited government and calls for an alignment of conservatism and libertarianism as natural allies with common goals. He defends the proper role of the production of defense as undertaken by insurance companies on a free market, and describes the emergence of private law among competing insurers.

Having established a natural order as superior on utilitarian grounds, the author goes on to assess the prospects for achieving a natural order. Informed by his analysis of the deficiencies of social democracy, and armed with the social theory of legitimation, he forsees secession as the likely future of the US and Europe, resulting in a multitude of region and city-states. This book complements the author’s previous work defending the ethics of private property and natural order. Democracy – The God that Failed will be of interest to scholars and students of history, political economy, and political philosophy.”